The Saudi F-35 Deal Reopens an Old American Trust Debate
Matthew Mbaka · September 18, 2026 · News
The United States has cleared a possible $24.3 billion sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. That does not mean 48 aircraft are about to arrive in Riyadh.
The State Department approval starts a congressional review of a package that includes 48 F-35s and 49 engines. Negotiations, conditions, production schedules and political opposition can still change or stop the deal.
The argument around it is bigger than the price. The F-35 carries some of America's most sensitive military technology, and Saudi Arabia remains a partner many Americans do not fully trust.
The 9/11 fact belongs in the story, with context
Fifteen of the 19 hijackers who carried out the September 11 attacks were Saudi nationals. That fact has shaped American views of the kingdom for 25 years, and it will inevitably return when Congress reviews a sale this sensitive.
It is not accurate to jump from the hijackers' nationality to collective guilt for Saudi Arabia or its current population.
The official 9/11 Commission Report said it found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded al-Qaeda. The report also examined Saudi-based fundraising networks, charities and contacts that raised serious concerns.
Both facts can be true: most of the hijackers were Saudi, and the Commission did not conclude that the Saudi government directed or funded the attack.
Using 9/11 as a slogan would flatten a complicated record. Ignoring it would miss why public trust remains fragile.
The immediate issue is control of sensitive technology
The F-35 is not simply another fighter sale. Its value comes from stealth, sensors, data fusion, electronic warfare and its ability to share information with other aircraft and command systems.
Reuters reported that US officials and lawmakers are concerned about protecting that technology, including the risk created by Saudi Arabia's relationship with China.
A sale can be configured with limits. The United States can control software, mission data, weapons, maintenance access, upgrades and where sensitive work is performed. It can require end-use monitoring and restrict which foreign personnel approach the aircraft.
Those controls reduce risk. They do not remove it. A customer operating the aircraft for decades gains facilities, technicians, data and opportunities for intelligence collection that do not exist before delivery.
Israel's military edge is another legal test
Israel is currently the only F-35 operator in the Middle East. US policy and law require Washington to consider Israel's qualitative military edge when approving major arms sales in the region.
That does not create an automatic veto for Israel. It does mean the Saudi configuration, weapons package, training and delivery schedule will be compared with Israel's capabilities.
Washington could preserve a gap by withholding certain weapons or software, supplying Israel with additional capabilities or delivering the Saudi aircraft on a slower schedule. Each option changes the military and political value of the deal.
Saudi Arabia is a partner with a difficult record
Supporters see Saudi Arabia as a major security partner facing Iran and Iran-aligned groups. The kingdom buys American equipment, hosts cooperation with US forces and sits beside critical energy and shipping routes.
Critics point to the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the civilian toll from the Yemen war, domestic repression and uncertainty about how the kingdom may use advanced weapons in a future regional crisis.
These are not side issues. Arms sales create relationships that last through training, spare parts, software updates and future weapons purchases. The US is choosing whom it will depend on as an operator of shared technology.
What Congress should ask
A serious review should move past the simple choice between “Saudi ally” and “Saudi threat.”
- Technology protection: Which hardware, software, mission data and maintenance systems would Saudi personnel access?
- China exposure: What restrictions would apply to Chinese telecom, cloud, defence and infrastructure relationships near F-35 operations?
- End use: Which missions and weapons would be permitted, and what happens if conditions are breached?
- Regional balance: How will the package preserve Israel's qualitative military edge and affect Iran, Turkey and other Gulf states?
- Delivery reality: When could aircraft actually arrive given F-35 production backlogs and existing customers?
- Exit options: Can the United States suspend software, parts, weapons or support without creating a dangerous fleet stranded mid-operation?
Congress can try to block or condition the sale. In practice, stopping a presidentially supported arms package can be politically difficult, especially if a veto has to be overcome.
The 9/11 history does not by itself answer whether Saudi Arabia should receive the F-35. It explains why trust cannot be assumed.
The better decision will rest on enforceable controls, not a declaration that the relationship has changed. If the technology protections, end-use rules and regional safeguards cannot survive a future political dispute, the sale is not ready.
Tags: Saudi Arabia, F-35, United States, 9/11, defence technology